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Clinical judgement, expertise and skilled coping 
Tim Thornton 
Summary 
Medicine involves specific practical expertise as well as more general context-independent 
medical knowledge. This raises the question, what is the nature of the expertise involved? Is 
there a model of clinical judgement or understanding that can accommodate both elements? 
This paper begins with a summary of a published account of the kinds of situation-specific 
skill found in anaesthesia. It authors claim that such skills are often neglected because of a 
prejudice in favour of the ‘technical rationality’ exemplified in Evidence Based Medicine but 
they do not themselves offer a general account of the relation of practical expertise and 
general medical knowledge. 
The philosopher Hubert Dreyfus provides one model of the relation of general knowledge to 
situation-specific skilled coping. He claims that the former logically depends on the latter and 
provides two arguments, which I articulate in the second section, for this. But he mars those 
arguments by building in the further assumption that such situation-specific responses must 
be understood as concept-free and thus mindless. That assumption is held in place by three 
arguments all of which I criticise in the next section to give a unified account of clinical 
judgement as both practical and conceptually structured and thus justified in the face of a 
prejudice in favour of ‘technical rationality’. 
Introduction 
Medicine is a practical as well as a descriptive scientific discipline. Medical expertise thus 
includes context-specific practical skills as well as more general context-independent medical 
knowledge. This raises the question, what is the nature of the expertise involved? Is there a 
model of clinical judgement or understanding that can accommodate both elements? Or do the 
particular practical skills have a different status and nature from the general theoretical 
framework of medical science? Is there a role for an element of judgement which resists 
codification in Evidence Based Medicine and if so how does it relate to EBM? 
In this paper, I will use a critical examination of Hubert Dreyfus’ arguments for the 
importance of skilled coping to help to articulate elements of an account of clinical 
judgement. Dreyfus plausibly argues for the importance of one-off, situation-specific, 
judgement to underpin more general codifications of knowledge. In medicine such 
codifications are found in statements of EBM. But he mars that claim by assuming that the 
practical and situation-specific coping must be pre-conceptual and mindless. Correcting that 
assumption enables one to think of clinical judgement as a conceptually informed capacity 
which can be expressed both in situation independent general claims as well as particular, 
situation-specific, practical interventions. 
Philosophy has to start from somewhere, however. Thus, in section 1, I summarise some of 
the findings of a series a ethnographic studies of anaesthetic expertise carried out by Andrew 
Smith, Catherine Pope and colleagues. They argue, empirically, that clinical expertise in 
anaesthesia involves a variety of factors including, importantly, a tacit dimension which is 
often neglected. I will use their descriptions of the features of expertise as a standard for a 
philosophically informed account. (I will thus not address the potential objection that this is 
the wrong starting point because the studies are descriptively inaccurate.) 
In the second section, I examine the account of skilled coping that Hubert Dreyfus draws both 
from Martin Heidegger’s work and from his own critique of AI-inspired cognitive science. 
Dreyfus argues that context-specific skilled coping is a precondition of abstract general 
knowledge. Viewing medical expertise as involving practical skilled coping in Dreyfus’ sense 
would thus be one way to understand the relationship between general medical knowledge 
and practical skill.  
On Dreyfus’ account, however, such coping does not express our conceptually structured 
understanding. In fact, it is not an expression of a mind at all. As I argue in section 3, this 
suggests that clinical judgement is implausibly bifurcated into a mindless skill, on the one 
hand, and mindful conceptual judgement on the other with no sense of how either can inform 
the other. Further, I will suggest, such an account might undermine the status of such skilled 
activity if it is characterised as merely mindless.  
There is, however, an alternative account available which fits Dreyfus’ argument for the 
priority of situation-based judgement but denies his claim that such judgement is not be 
conceptually informed. In the fourth section I outline John McDowell’s view that concepts 
can be exercised in context-specific actions even when there is no general and context 
independent account of the content of those concepts. This gives rise to a conception of 
clinical judgement as a conceptually informed capacity that finds expression in both explicit, 
conceptually articulated judgements – general medical knowledge – but also in practical 
context-sensitive skills. Clinical judgement is thus akin to phronesis. 
In what follows I use ‘expertise’ to refer the findings of the ethnographic studies described in 
section 1, ‘skilled coping’ for Dreyfus’ semi-technical concept-free notion and ‘clinical 
judgement’ as the general intellectual capacity that stands in need of a philosophical account. 
1: Expertise in anaesthesia 
Clinical expertise in anaesthesia has been ethnographically examined by a team comprising a 
consultant anaesthetist, a former anaesthetic nurse and two [1]. In this first section I will draw 
some of their key findings to set the scene for the philosophical discussion of clinical 
judgement to come. 
Smith et al argue that anaesthesia is underpinned by context-specific knowledge [2]. The 
main value of their ethnographic approach is that it is able to chart this in addition to, and by 
contrast with, general context-independent knowledge. Context-specific knowledge is often 
overlooked, however, because of the dominance of: 
‘technical rationality’ – a model of professional activity as problem solving which is 
made ‘rigorous’ by the application of scientific theory and technique. The dominance 
of technical rationality leaves practitioners unable to account for those aspects of 
practice that lie outside this model. [2] 
Much of the data for their analysis takes the form of field notes and it is worth giving a 
flavour of this: 
The surgeon (S1) discusses patient details with the anaesthetist and asks the age of 
the patient. The anaesthetist (A1) reads in the notes and says ‘54’. A1 injects small 
syringe into the drip and disposes of the empty syringe in the sharps bucket, adjusts 
the volume of oxygen again, and adjusts the bed having been asked to do so by S1. 
A1 checks the patient’s notes. The ventilator pump is moving and making a slight 
sound at this point. A1 stands up and begins to write some more details in the notes. 
One of the green lights is pulsing on and off and is sometimes continuous. There is a 
pulsing noise fairly regularly but not very loud. Male 1 returns to talk quietly to the 
A1. I can also hear the diathermy, which is making long beeping noises while the 
surgeons are operating. A1 sits down watching the patient’s head and glancing at the 
screen on the monitors. She adjusts the oxygen dial. (OB 13: observation of 
consultant anaesthetist.) [2] 
Of this description of a routine gynaecological procedure, they report: 
Here, the anaesthetist has available to her a number of types of knowledge. There is 
knowledge of the patient as a person (‘social knowledge’) derived from the 
preoperative visit. There is knowledge from the patient’s case notes. She is also 
gathering knowledge about the patient’s physiological progress during anaesthesia 
from direct observation and indirectly through electronic monitors. Underlying all 
this there is formal theoretical knowledge and the knowledge gained from experience. 
[2] 
This claim highlights the first of four key points which stand out from the descriptive analysis 
(though the authors do not summarise things in quite this way). 
Clinical expertise in anaesthesia involves: 
1. a variety of epistemic factors 
2. a variety of kinds of skill 
3. a sensitivity to specific contexts or situations 
4. a sensitivity to specific patients 
First, the expertise studied involves the ability to form judgements in the light of a variety of 
epistemic factors or a variety of sources of information. 
A key characteristic of expertise in anaesthesia is the simultaneous balancing of many 
different streams and types of knowledge. Anaesthetists have to recall what they have 
learned in the past (both formal learning and previous clinical experiences), and to 
interpret emerging and potentially misleading electronic signals about the state of the 
anaesthetized patient. [2] 
Thus one aspect is a skill in synthesising different elements. In one example they give, two 
formal guidelines conflict in a particular case and a skilled clinician has to judge which is the 
right one to follow in the particular context. 
Second, it involves different kinds of skill, including both physical and recognitional skills. 
Mental and manual dexterity are required in expert practice, and an ability to 
recognize and respond to changes in the condition of the anaesthetized patient. This 
contrasts dramatically with the view of anaesthetic work as largely technical and 
formulized. [2] 
Thus the expertise is not merely an ability to frame explicit judgements on the basis of 
codified guidelines but also seeing what is the case in particular circumstances and making 
physical interventions from positioning a patient’s head to manipulating complex machinery. 
Third, and as already mentioned, it is sensitive to and dependent on specific contexts or 
situations. 
Expertise depends to some extent on its social context and so is vulnerable to changes 
in that context. This respondent talks about a recent change in his working 
environment:  
You can be an expert in one theatre, and in the next door theatre you may not be an 
expert, because you are not used to working in that environment. I had been a 
consultant for 15 yr but I felt like a fish out of water… (Interview with consultant 
anaesthetist.) [2] 
An ability to read the situation in a familiar theatre may not transfer across to others. An 
ability to read the social cues of one medical team may not carry over to another. This 
suggests that the form of expertise is, in one important sense, not fully general. 
Fourth, in addition to general context dependence it is also highly patient-specific.  
I don’t need six theatre nurses who have been on an ALS [Advanced Life Support] 
course telling me what drugs to use. We talk a lot about protocols, we talk a lot about 
clinical governance, we talk a lot about doing things the same way but I think there is 
a sense in which that ability to provide appropriate care for a particular patient is lost 
once you start ‘ALS-ing it’. (Interview with consultant anaesthetist.) [2] 
Repeated reference was made to the need to tailor anaesthetics to individual patients, 
and the need for constant vigilance because of the dynamic nature and implicit 
uncertainty of anaesthesia. [2] 
Smith et al even describe one case in which standard general clinical guidelines (proffered by 
a student) are trumped by the patient-specific recognition of a more experienced anaesthetist. 
These four features of the expertise described suggest the need for philosophical 
investigation. How seriously should we take the view that there are different kinds of 
knowledge involved rather than, for example, different knowledge claims derived from 
different sources but possible forming a single kind? Is there a connection or a difference of 
kind between the practical and cognitive?  
Whilst the ethnographic investigation of anaesthesia helps to highlight the kind of features 
that are in play in clinical expertise, it seems to be pitched at the wrong level to answer 
questions of the nature of the skill or knowledge involved. I suggest that philosophical 
reflection can also shed some light on the plea with which Smith et al end their paper: 
[T]acit forms of knowledge are vital for skilful practice in anaesthesia but are 
downplayed in formal statements of training. Although by definition tacit knowledge 
can never be fully articulated, we suggest that anaesthetists should be encouraged to 
acknowledge the central role of these elements in learning and maintaining their 
expertise. [2] 
One reason that tacit elements of clinical judgement are downplayed in formal training is the 
rise of Evidence Based Medicine. But, as I will suggest at the end, a proper understanding of 
clinical judgement helps to unite both tacit elements and the general explicit statements that 
underpin EBM [cf 3]. 
2: Dreyfus on skilled coping 
In this section, I will outline Hubert Dreyfus’ account of skilled coping. It is based on 
arguments drawn from two projects. One is his argument against AI-influenced cognitive 
science. In What Computers Still Can’t Do, he argues that the project of modeling intelligence 
on algorithms or sets of instructions or rules faces a vicious and undermining regress [4]. I 
will return to the nature of the regress later. 
His other project is the interpretation of the philosopher Martin Heidegger’s Being and Time. 
Dreyfus finds in Heidegger the basis for a reorientation of philosophical approaches to 
knowledge, a reorientation which places embodied practical know-how rather than 
disinterested context-free ‘knowledge-that’ at the heart of the analysis. Following Heidegger, 
he stresses the importance of skilled coping for an account of how it is possible to think about 
the world at all.  
Traditionally, philosophers have assumed that the most basic understanding we have of 
objects is as mere space occupying stuff. Heidegger argues that our basic stance is practical. 
Objects are first encountered as tools or equipment with taken for granted uses and purposes. 
Only given that understanding of what is ‘ready-to-hand’ can one have a more abstracted 
understanding of objects now thought of decontextualised from such practical projects and 
merely as space occupying and ‘present-at-hand’. 
This stress on the primacy of practical coping and of tacit over explicit knowledge captures 
some of what Dreyfus finds in Heidegger’s approach. But Dreyfus thinks that it forms an 
important clue to something more fundamental. 
It looks like Heidegger thus inverts the tradition and sees detached contemplation as a 
privative modification of everyday involvement…. But if one simply inverts the 
tradition, one risks being misunderstood and reappropriated. [5] 
Heidegger does not want to make practical activity primary; he wants to show… that 
neither practical activity nor contemplative knowing can be understood as a relation 
between a self-sufficient mind and an independent world. [5] 
Heidegger sees… that such an account introduces the subject/object distinction. It 
allows the separation of an intentional content that is mental from an objective world 
that may or may not be the way the mind takes it to be… Heidegger accepts 
intentional directness as essential to human activity, but he denies that intentionality 
is mental, that it is… the distinguishing characteristic of mental states. [5] 
There is something potentially misleading about thinking of Dreyfus (following Heidegger) as 
arguing for the primacy of a form of tacit knowledge. The problem is that this risks simply 
building into a conception of tacit knowledge features of explicit knowledge that Dreyfus 
thinks are properly thought of as dependent on it. As one commentator puts it: 
[I]t would be wrong to say that practical coping involves a ‘tacit’ understanding 
embedded in skilful dealings with things. That would mistakenly suggest that skills 
are already propositionally contentful, even though their content is not explicitly 
spoken or kept in mind. Dreyfus insists that skilful coping does not even have tacit 
propositional content. Beliefs, desires, and other propositional attitudes are not 
appropriately attributed as background to coping skills; instead, Dreyfus argues that 
propositional attitudes are only intelligible against a background of nonpropositional 
comportments. [6] 
Dreyfus’ conception of skilled coping is more basic than might at first be thought. It is not 
merely that coping is embodied and practical. Coping might be both of those but still be 
intellectually guided. Dreyfus argues, instead, that it is a form of practical activity which is 
neither conceptually nor propositionally structured, nor expressive of mental states at all, but 
on which conceptually or propositionally structured understanding depends. 
The crucial distinction is between forms of thought or understanding in which the subject is 
aware of a distinction between subject and object – ‘thematic’ understanding – and a more 
basic immersion in a situation which lacks any such awareness. It is thus a mistake to think of 
skilled coping as tacit knowledge because: 
Knowing is an exemplary subject/object relation, so that if one makes knowing basic, 
one is from the start locked into the intentionalistic picture of human beings as 
subjects with beliefs… about objects and states of affairs. [5] 
Instead ‘all thematic intentionality must take place on a background of transparent coping’ 
[5]. Knowledge, whether explicit or tacit, is derived from a more basic form of situation-
based intentionality or coping. 
How does skilled scoping help to explain how thematic thought can connect to the world? 
One answer is that skilled coping directly concerns features of the world. The situation in 
which one is immersed itself plays a constitutive role in the activity. This contrasts with a key 
feature of thematic thought. The ‘intentional object’ of one’s propositional attitudes need 
neither be true nor refer to anything real. One can believe that Father Christmas will call even 
though ‘he’ will not, because he does not exist. This is what is meant by the ‘intentional 
inexistence’ of the contents of propositional attitudes. By contrast, a skilled pianist’s 
immersion in playing a particular piece of music on a particular piano does not have the 
potential for a separation from the world implicit in the idea of intentional inexistence. The 
presence of the piano itself, perhaps a very particular piano, plays an essential role in her 
activity. Her skilled coping is thus situation-specific. 
[P]ractical intentional comportment is not mediated by mental representations, a 
sensory manifold, tacit rules, or other forms of intentional content abstractable from 
the material setting of what one is doing. [6] 
This idea of situation-specificity also plays a role in Dreyfus’ second main argument for the 
importance of skilled coping based on his critique of using algorithmic AI to model human 
intelligence. In What Computers Still Can’t Do, Dreyfus argues that AI approaches assume 
that the mind is algorithmic but that they cannot cope with a regress that such an approach 
initiates [4]. If correct, such an argument would show the importance of a tacit dimension to 
clinical judgement in addition to whatever can be made explicit in EBM [cf 3]. 
Dreyfus illustrates the general challenge for AI approaches in the example of attempting to 
model the behaviour of selecting a red square from a multicoloured array of geometrical 
figures. On an AI approach, there must be a set of instructions that fully capture the expertise 
involved in the task. And there is a level at which rules may be helpful. One might instruct a 
child, for example, to ‘listen to the instructions, look toward the objects, consider the shapes, 
make your selection’ [4]. But the AI approach would required more detailed instructions 
sufficient, for example, for identifying a square rather than a circle.  
One might say: ‘Count the sides; if there are four, it is a square.’ And what about the 
instructions for identifying a side? ‘Take random points and see if they fall on a line 
which is the shortest distance between the end points,’ and so on. And how does one 
find these points?... ‘But you unconsciously see points and unconsciously count.’ But 
do you? And why do the instructions stop here and not earlier or later? [4] 
The underlying problem highlighted in this example is that of knowing which general rule 
applies to a particular case. Whilst we know that if something is a red square then it is red and 
a square and if it is square then it has four equal sides these inferences unpack our prior 
mastery of the concepts. But the challenge of AI is to explain how such general concepts 
apply to particular cases: cases which are all alike in being red and square but potentially 
unlike in all sorts of other ways such as size, location in space and time, orientation etc. But 
the attempt to explicate a general rule – such as the rule governing ‘square’ – using further 
rules appears to initiate a vicious regress. What rules guide the application of the subsequent 
rules? 
If the AI project is to model human intelligence or expertise through algorithms or rules, then 
the rules cannot leave something important undetermined. If, for example, one claims that the 
lowest level of rules are themselves automatically followed without instructions then ‘we 
might as well claim that skilled behaviour need not be based on unconsciously followed 
instructions at any level’ [4]. 
Dreyfus suggests that this regress can be blocked by an appeal to situations.  
Whatever it is that enables human beings to zero in on the relevant facts without 
definitively excluding others which might become relevant is so hard to describe that 
it has only recently become a clearly focused problem for philosophers. It has to do 
with the way man is at home in his world, has it comfortably wrapped around him, so 
to speak. Human beings are somehow already situated in such a way that what they 
need in order to cope with things is distributed around them where they need it, not 
packed away like a trunk full of objects… [4] 
For humans, the world is first encountered in situations that are already rich in practical 
significance. Thus the regress attaching to the task of explaining in general terms how general 
knowledge applies to particular cases is blocked by appeal to direct responses to particular 
situations. This idea of situations connects back to his other project. The component elements 
of situations are not isolated objects (present-at-hand) but handy tools or equipment with uses 
and purposes.  
Dreyfus thus presents a picture of skilled coping as a fundamental feature of world-directed 
activity and thought. Rather than being the poor relative of explicit propositional knowledge-
that, it is fundamental. Whilst there could in principle be human tribes who practiced skilled 
coping but possessed no explicit knowledge, explicit knowledge without skilled coping would 
be impossible. In the next section I will, however, voice some general criticisms of the 
bifurcated picture of clinical judgement to which Dreyfus’ account of skilled coping leads. 
This will lead in the fourth section to an articulation of a clinical judgement that is still 
informed by Dreyfus’ argument for the importance of the practical but which spurns his 
rejection of mediation by concepts. 
3: Problems with Dreyfus account for medical expertise 
In the first section I outlined four features of anaesthetic expertise. It involves: 
1. a variety of epistemic factors 
2. a variety of kinds of skills 
3. a sensitivity to specific contexts or situations 
4. a sensitivity to specific patients 
Dreyfus’ account of skilled coping fits some of these very well and thus it might appear that 
anaesthetic expertise is just skilled coping in Dreyfus’ sense. Like skilled coping, anaesthetic 
expertise involves context-specific elements. It involves – points 3 and 4 above – both 
sensitivity to specific contexts or situations and to specific patients. 
An operating theatre is a paradigmatic situation in Dreyfus’ sense: an environment set up for a 
particular purpose with, for a skilled clinician, familiar equipment ready-to-hand. A familiar 
anaesthetised patient is another, albeit animate, part of the situation with a set of 
interdependent vital systems to be monitored and attended to. 
Whilst Dreyfus’ account is not directed to interpersonal skilled coping, it dovetails with a 
plausible approach to interpersonal understanding that would fit anaesthetists working with 
colleagues. In recent philosophy of mind discussion of knowledge of other people’s minds 
has been dominated by a rivalry between ‘theory theory’ and ‘simulation theory’ accounts [7]. 
According to theory theory approaches, access to, and thus knowledge of, other people’s 
minds is mediated by possession of a theory of mind: a body of deductively structured 
generalisations about the unseen causes of observable (speech and other) behaviour. 
The main contrast with theory theory is simulation theory. It explains knowledge of other 
minds not by possession of a theory of minds but merely by possession of a mind itself. The 
idea is that it is possible to have knowledge of another person’s mental states by 
imaginatively putting oneself into his or her predicament. One ‘runs’ one’s deliberative 
processes ‘off line’, as it were.  
Both these models look too intellectual to fit aspects of the accounts of skilled interaction by 
clinical teams. By contrast, Dreyfus’ description of coping suggests a third possibility. Social 
coping is itself a non-thematic interpersonal interaction akin to the skilled coping with the 
non-social environment [cf 8]. This is helped by the fact that Dreyfus himself suggests that 
the use of words, in skilled coping, need not imply a thematic, propositionally guided 
understanding. Words can act as tools and be manipulated in the same immersed way as other 
pieces of (medical) equipment.  
Sometimes words are, indeed, used as equipment in the local situation and language 
functions transparently in a nonpropositional way. In my Commentary I use the 
example of a doctor, intent on an operation in progress, saying ‘scalpel’ to her nurse 
and soon finding one in her hand. [9] 
Such social interactions share the same non-thematic, non-propositional character despite 
their linguistic mediation. (Given that I will reject Dreyfus’ account of concept-free skilled 
coping I owe a suitably direct account of knowledge of other minds. See [10].) 
The second feature identified from the ethnographic studies of anaesthesia – point 2 above - 
was the variety of kinds of skills involved. Here the idea of a mix of both manual dexterity 
and recognitional skills fits Dreyfus’ discussion. What does not fit as a case of skilled coping 
is the more intellectual aspect: the ‘mental dexterity’ revealed in some of the more explicit 
judgements. Nor does the remaining feature identified – point 1 above – the simultaneous 
balancing of many different streams and types of knowledge.  
On Dreyfus’ account, skilled coping is non-propositional and non-thematic but can give way 
to propositional and thematic understanding when something breaks down. Paradigmatically, 
a hammer is transparent when all goes well for the carpenter hammering nails. But if it breaks 
then it becomes an object for the carpenter’s conscious attention, something to be noticed and 
then dealt with. This is the more typical case for language use. The previous quotation thus 
continues: 
But often language is used propositionally as when there is some disturbance and the 
carpenter says that his hammer is too heavy and asks a co-worker to hand him the 
lighter one. [9] 
In fact there are numerous levels described in Being-in-the-World [5]. In the face of a 
temporary breakdown, skilled coping is forced to give way to acting deliberately, ‘paying 
attention to what we are doing’. When even that is blocked by a more serious disturbance, one 
is forced into ‘still another stance, deliberation. This involves reflective planning’ [5]. There 
are then further stances becoming increasing less immersed less context-specific and more 
abstract and general. A scientist’s theoretical understanding of objects and a traditional 
philosopher’s ontological understanding of them are both yet further from the full immersion 
of skilled coping. It is only in disturbances of coping or in these yet less contextualised cases 
of understanding that activity is guided by mental content, by propositionally or conceptually 
structured awareness. 
Dreyfus’ Heideggerian comments about the transparency of equipment in skilled coping and 
its contrasting visibility in cases of breakdown seem to be phenomenologically (with a small 
p) accurate. But their application to medical expertise would suggest a divided account. 
According to the model there is, on the one hand, the non-conceptual skilled coping that 
characterises mindless immersed activity. On the other hand, there is deliberate activity 
guided by mental states and further context-independent theoretical and minded 
understanding. 
This bifurcation seems implausible, however, as it divides the active employment of skills 
into those which are movements shared with animals from those which are mindful, 
conceptually structured actions. Thus there is a strange lacuna in his account when, when 
things go wrong, conceptual structure springs into being where, despite the recognitional and 
practical skills previously deployed, there was none, apparently, before. Further, if skilled 
coping is not expressive of an understanding of the relevant concepts there seems to be no 
way that it can inform or be informed by explicit conceptually structured judgement.  
In the case of medical expertise, this feature of Dreyfus’ account has a further strategic 
disadvantage. In the face of Smith et al’s final plea - ‘Although by definition tacit knowledge 
can never be fully articulated, we suggest that anaesthetists should be encouraged to 
acknowledge the central role of these elements in learning and maintaining their expertise’ [2] 
– Dreyfus’ bifurcation of conceptual and non-conceptual elements is more likely to feed the 
prejudices of what Smith calls ‘technical rationality’ and downplay as merely mindless tacit 
aspects of clinical expertise. 
To sum up, Dreyfus provides two arguments for the central role of skilled coping to underpin 
and augment explicit knowledge. One is based on the idea that the AI-inspired aim to model 
human intelligence on general rules faces a vicious regress that has to be blocked by appeal to 
engaged responses to particular situations. General context-independent knowledge must be 
based on situation-specific responses. The other argument is that world-directed thought must 
depend on a more basic connection to the world. Skilled coping plays that role but the 
explanatory requirements placed on it seem to require that it is construed as world-involving 
but essentially mindless. But as I have argued in this section, that final requirement suggests 
that it is a poor basis on which to understand clinical judgement. 
In the next section I will outline an alternative account building on the discussion of Dreyfus 
but also based on the work of John McDowell. In the recent debate between Dreyfus and 
McDowell, it has become clear that a key additional reason that Dreyfus denies that skilled 
coping is conceptually informed is an assumption about the essential generality of concepts 
that can be rejected. Rejecting that assumption and rethinking the explanatory requirements 
for skilled coping allows a more unified account of clinical expertise and judgement. Whilst, 
as the ethnographic investigation of anaesthesia reveals, core clinical skills are not restricted 
to the codifications of technical rationality, this does not imply that they are not conceptually 
structured. 
4: A conceptualised form of context-specific practical knowledge 
The clue to McDowell’s account that I will follow is a parallel between skilled action on the 
one hand and experience on the other. In his book Mind and World, McDowell attempts to 
give an account of experience that avoids two potential pitfalls driven by two assumptions 
that appear to be in tension. One assumption is that the ability to have thoughts at all depends 
on the ability to think thoughts that are empirically based. The world, that is, must have some 
input to our thought. (This assumption about a worldly input to thought has something in 
common with Dreyfus’ assumption that thematic understanding needs further explanation 
through world-involving skilled coping.) The other assumption is that thoughts are essentially 
rationally connected and that this rational connection depends on both elements that are 
connected being conceptually structured. Our only model of a rational connection is between 
two conceptually structured entities.  
An account of the empirical grounding of thought thus oscillates, according to McDowell, 
between two opposing but unsatisfactory positions depending on which of the two 
assumptions dominates. Playing up the second, it can take the form of a coherentist account of 
thought. A belief is justified if it coheres with our other beliefs, for example. But if so, this 
picture threatens to undermine any connection between thought and the empirical world. It 
becomes a frictionless spinning in the void. If an account plays up the first assumption then it 
may take the form of a commitment to what McDowell following the US philosopher Wilfrid 
Sellars calls the ‘Myth of the Given’ [11]. Thought is, indeed, connected to the empirical 
world but only, impossibly, via brute causal impacts that cannot, in fact, sustain any kind of 
rational constraint on what we ought to think.  
The seesaw can be avoided by crediting experience itself with a conceptual structure. When, 
for example, we open our eyes, our conceptual capacities are passively drawn on. To 
articulate this position, McDowell quotes Kant: ‘Thoughts without content are empty, 
intuitions without concepts are blind’ [12]. Providing that the intuitions and concepts that 
together form empirical experiences are not thought of as potentially separable elements of a 
compound, Kant’s slogan forms a clue to a description of experience that avoids the 
oscillation.  
Just as experience is conceptually structured, so, McDowell argues, is the behavioural 
‘output’ of thought. Echoing the Kantian slogan above he says: ‘Similarly, intentions without 
overt activity are idle, and movements of limbs without concepts are mere happenings, not 
expressions of agency’ [13]. 
So action, like perception, is permeated with conceptual rationality. This underpins 
McDowell’s distinction within what would be for Dreyfus equally examples of skilled but 
mindless coping of rational and non-rational agents. 
When a rational agent catches a frisbee, she is realizing a concept of a thing to do. In 
the case of a skilled agent, she does not do that by realizing other concepts of things 
to do... But she does realize a concept of, say, catching this… 
When a dog catches a frisbee, he is not realizing any practical concept; in the relevant 
sense, he has none. The point of saying that the rational agent, unlike the dog, is 
realizing a concept in doing what she does is that her doing, underr a specification 
that captures the content of the practical concept that she is realizing, comes within 
the scope of her practical rationality. [14] 
Even an act as spontaneous and context-specific as catching this frisbee now can be part of 
the narrative of events of a rational agent and fit her concepts of, for example, the right way to 
spend a summer’s morning. Concepts can be exercised in action just as much as they can be 
in explicit linguistic judgements. 
As I have already described, Dreyfus rejects this view. He asks, explicitly and rhetorically:  
Can we accept McDowell’s Sellarsian claim that perception is conceptual ‘all the way 
out,’ thereby denying the more basic perceptual capacities we seem to share with 
prelinguistic infants and higher animals? More generally, can philosophers 
successfully describe the conceptual upper floors of the edifice of knowledge while 
ignoring the embodied coping going on on the ground floor; in effect declaring that 
human experience is upper stories all the way down? [15] 
This rhetorical question is, however, backed up by two arguments that are meant to show that 
McDowell’s account of skilled coping cannot be right because such coping cannot be 
correctly thought of as an exercise of concepts. 
One argument has already been mentioned. It is the idea that, unlike explicit thematic thought, 
skilled coping is essentially situation-specific. The pianist’s skilful playing of a piece of 
music is essentially dependent on the existence of the piano. It would not be the coping it is 
with either no piano or a very different piano. (It might be something different such as a 
careful mime act.) By contrast, conceptually structured thoughts can float free of actual 
situations and concern non-existent states of affairs or objects.  
The other argument turns on the generality of concepts. Dreyfus makes this point by 
considering phronesis. Aristotle distinguished phronesis from general scientific knowledge or 
episteme and technical knowledge or know-how: techne. Phronesis is practical wisdom: 
practical in the sense of concerning how to change aspects of the world. That is its intended 
aim or output and suggests that it serves as a good model for medical practice. But its inputs 
are particular states of affairs. It is ‘concerned with particulars as well as universals, and 
particulars become known from experience… [thus] some length of time is needed to produce 
it’ [16]. 
Dreyfus suggest that phronesis is the paradigm case of human perception and action. But he 
suggests that, on a proper understanding of it, it cannot fit McDowell’s conceptualised 
account. In the exercise of phronesis in making ethical judgements, for example, one simply 
sees what to do, without deliberation. 
As Aristotle says: Phronesis… involves knowledge of the ultimate particular thing, 
which cannot be attained by systematic knowledge but only by “perception.”… 
Aristotle’s account of phronesis does not assume, as McDowell does, that, ethical 
expertise can be conceptually articulated. On the contrary, phronesis shows that 
socialization can produce a kind of master whose actions do not rely on habits based 
on reasons to guide him. Indeed, thanks to socialization, a person’s perceptions and 
actions at their best would be so responsive to the specific situation that they could 
not be captured in general concepts. [15] 
Neither of these arguments works, however. To take the first, as McDowell is merely one of a 
number of philosophers who have argued for the importance for an understanding of agents’ 
speech and action of demonstrative thoughts, thoughts tied to particular objects. Thus my 
thought about that cat sitting on the chair to my left picks out a particular cat in a distinct way 
from a merely descriptive thought (such as the cat in room such and such …; or the best cat in 
the world…) even if, in fact, these pick out the same cat. That is because I may not be aware 
that I am in room such and such, or that that cat is the best cat. To understand how 
demonstrative thoughts work is to understand their conceptual content. Thus insisting that 
skilled coping is situation-specific cannot show that it is not conceptually structured if there 
are good reasons to hold that conceptually structured thoughts can also be situation-specific. 
As to the second argument, Dreyfus assumes that the skilled recognition involved in 
phronesis in seeing, for example, what ought morally to be done in a particular situation 
cannot in general be codified. That is, it cannot be captured in context-free general guidelines 
(akin to what Smith et al call ‘technical rationality’). Furthermore, it is plausible that the very 
idea a conceptually structured understanding is in some sense general. Concepts can be 
instantiated in more than one way. (Even the concept of being a particular person, being 
Frege, say, could have been realised by the same man in different ways, had Frege eaten or 
exercised more, for example. [17]) But phronesis can have the generality of a habit and thus 
can be general even if the only way to specify its output is a kind of demonstrative. 
No doubt the very idea of a habit implies a generality of content. But conceiving 
phronesis as a habit, or a set of habits, is consistent with holding that the only way 
one can register the generality of phronesis is by a description on these lines: ‘the 
habit of responding to situations as phronesis requires’. And that leaves what 
response a particular situation calls for from the phronimos still needing to be 
determined by situation-specific discernment. [18] 
Dreyfus’ account of skilled coping seems to be based on the idea that the exercise of concepts 
must be explicable in a situation-independent manner. Given that skilled coping is situation-
dependent, then it cannot be a matter of conceptually informed acting. Hence it becomes 
merely mindless. There is an irony here. Dreyfus’ argument against the pretensions of AI 
inspired cognitive science turns on their inability to describe the role of a practical 
responsiveness to situations for human subjects. It is that which enables Dreyfus’ account of 
rational agents to sidestep the worry of a regress of rules in knowing which rule should guide 
behaviour at any one point. But, it appears, Dreyfus shares with AI an assumption about the 
nature of conceptual rationality: that it is situation independent. It is that which forces the 
bifurcation between merely mindless coping and minded exercises of conceptual judgement. 
Whilst these arguments help to disarm Dreyfus’ two arguments against a concept-involving 
model of skilled coping, what of the argument described earlier in this paper that such coping 
must be free of concepts if it is to help explain thematic understanding? Dreyfus’ emphasis on 
skilled coping is part of a broader argument that knowledge, whether contemplative or 
practical, cannot be ‘understood as a relation between a self-sufficient mind and an 
independent world’. Any account of the mind that starts from world-independent states faces 
an unanswerable challenge in explaining how they can come to be about anything, to possess 
intentionality. World-dependent skilled coping is supposed to escape that challenge, as there 
is no sense to asking whether a pianists’ playing concerns a piano, for example. But it is a 
further and unjustified step to assume, as Dreyfus does, that the coping involved is mindless, 
is not expressive of a subject’s conceptual understanding. Mind and world can be connected 
in both experience and action, both of which are world-involving, without stripping these of 
the conceptual shaping which is expressive of minds. 
Conclusions for clinical judgement 
Smith and his colleagues highlight some of the aspects of medical expertise found through 
ethnographic study of anaesthesia. These include a variety of factors from seamless practical 
manipulations of machinery and patients, through near constant assimilation of a variety of 
sources of information to explicit discussion with colleagues. They conclude that an important 
element of this is a form of tacit knowledge which is both of central importance to good 
clinical practice but also neglected by the emphasis on what they call ‘technical rationality’ 
often stressed in medical education. Whilst they do not themselves say this, the emphasis on 
technical rationality is expressed in, and sustained by, the more general recent rise of 
Evidence Based Medicine which plays down the role of clinical judgement in favour of 
general guidelines and codifications of medical practice. 
In this paper, I have looked to the work of Hubert Dreyfus to articulate a model of clinical 
judgement that might help counter that over-emphasis on technical rationality. Dreyfus argues 
that conceptual and thematic understanding depends on a prior background of situation-
specific skilled coping. Thus, according to his arguments, the general articulation of 
knowledge implicit in EBM presupposes the kind of one-off judgement and situation 
sensitivity that forms part of good clinical judgement. But Dreyfus assumes that skilled 
coping is not itself informed by a subject’s conceptual capacities. They come into play only in 
the face of some sort of breakdown of practical skill. Thus whilst Dreyfus’ argument helps to 
counter the prejudice in favour of technical rationality – by arguing for its dependence on a 
background of situation-specific coping – his account of skilled coping is merely mindless: 
uninformed by conceptual understanding. This presents an implausible bifurcation within the 
account of clinical judgement and threatens to provide a further reason to downplay skilled 
coping if it is characterised as merely mindless. 
Dreyfus’ arguments against the priority of explicit and general knowledge over particular and 
situation based judgement can, however, be divorced from his account of the latter as 
concept-free skilled coping. Conceptually structured judgements and actions can be situation-
specific. The necessary generality of a concept – the fact that it can be instanced in an open 
ended variety of ways – need not rule out its context-specificity. On this McDowellian 
approach, there is no bifurcation between the practical skills, outlined in the case of 
anaesthesia but characteristic of medicine as a whole, and the explicit clinical judgements that 
are also an integral part of medical expertise. 
Correcting Dreyfus’ account suggests instead a unified model of clinical judgement that better 
fits the description of expertise in anaesthesia. To possess good clinical judgement is to 
possess a conceptually informed medical understanding. That is not to deny that some 
clinicians will be better at practical patient-specific interventions and others better at 
judgements more readily describable in the general terms of EBM. But such differences are 
differences of degree rather than a difference of kind between conceptual and non-conceptual 
elements of medical practice. Clinical judgement can be expressed in abstract and context-
independent general claims and also brought to bear on particular situations where the most 
general thing that can be said is that this (demonstrating an action) is the way things should be 
done. Although both descriptive and practical, medicine is conceptually structured through 
and through. 
Is there, therefore, a role for an element of judgement which resists capture within the 
codifications of EBM within good medical practice? Is there anything of that sense of 
‘judgement’ in the description of ‘clinical judgement’ set out above? I have highlighted three 
elements of an answer to this question. First: following Dreyfus’ argument as corrected in the 
fourth section, EBM is only possible because of world-directed situation-specific judgements. 
Second: such judgements are not, however, divorced from general conceptually shaped 
understanding. (They are not instances of skilled coping in Dreyfus’ sense.) Third: there may 
be no way to express a conceptually mediated situation-specific judgement except by saying: 
“It should be done like this!” or “Such and such a symptom looks like this!” Given that such 
judgements cannot be framed in general context-free terms there is indeed a role for the 
traditional understanding of clinical judgement even within contemporary Evidence Based 
Medicine. 
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